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Thanks: Matthew, audience…  
Many of you, I am sure, will be familiar with the image of the ‘martial Gurkha’. The image dates from 
nineteenth century India, and though the suggestion that the Nepalese are inherently martial 
appears dubious, images of ‘warlike Gurkhas’ continue to circulate in contemporary discourse. Only 
last week, Dipprasad Pun, of the Royal Gurkha Rifles, was awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross 
for single-handedly fighting off up to 30 Taliban insurgents. In 2010, reports surfaced that an 
(unnamed) Gurkha had been reprimanded for using his ‘traditional’ kukri knife to behead a Taliban 
insurgent, an act which prompted the Daily Mail to exclaim ‘Thank god they’re on our side!) Thus, 
the bravery and the brutality of the Gurkhas – two staple elements of nineteenth century 
representations – continue to be replayed.  
Such images have also been mobilised in other contexts. On 4 November 2008, Chief Superintendent 
Kevin Hurley, of the Metropolitan Police, told the Commons’ Home Affairs Select Committee, that 
Gurkhas would make excellent ‘recruits’ to the capital’s police service. Describing the British Army’s 
Nepalese veterans as loyal, disciplined, hardworking and brave, Hurley reported that the Met’s 
senior commanders believed that ex-Gurkhas could provide a valuable resource to London’s police. 
Many Gurkhas, it was noted, were multilingual (in subcontinental languages, useful for policing the 
capital’s diverse population), fearless (and therefore unlikely to be intimidated by the apparently 
rising tide of knife and gun crime) and, Hurley noted, the recruiting of these ‘loyal’, ‘brave’ and 
‘disciplined’ Nepalese would also provide an excellent (and, one is tempted to add, convenient) 
means of diversifying the workforce.   
In an attempt to provide ‘context’ for their discussions, Martin Howe, the solicitor acting on 
behalf of a number of ex-Gurkhas, told the Committee, that   
The Gurkhas have served Britain loyally for the last 200 years. This is not a new matter. The 
Gurkhas have a fierce reputation as fine soldiers; they are known as the bravest of the brave. 
Their motto is: It is better to die than to live a coward. They have died for Britain. 50,000 of 
them have died for Britain. 150,000 of them have been seriously wounded in battles over 
the last 200 years defending our interests. They are our soldiers. 
2 
 
The Home Affairs Committee was hearing evidence in considering the rights of Gurkhas to settle in 
the United Kingdom. In the previous September, in a case brought by five Gurkha veterans and the 
widow of a deceased sixth soldier, the High Court instructed the Home Office to reconsider 
directions which prevented some Gurkha veterans from obtaining visas to settle in the United 
Kingdom. According to the judgement, the existing policy  – which prohibited those veterans who 
retired from British service before 1997 from settling in Britain – gave rise to ‘irrational and unlawful’ 
restrictions.  Mr Justice Blake said that ‘Rewarding long and distinguished service by the grant of 
residence in this country for whom the service was performed would be a vindication and an 
enhancement of *the military+ covenant’.1 The judgment was a notable success for the high-profile 
‘Gurkha Justice’ campaign, which has attracted the support of a number of prominent individuals, 
most notably Joanna Lumley, whose father served with the Gurkhas. 
Having heard the evidence supplied by the witnesses, the select committee recommended 
that all ex-Gurkhas be allowed settlement rights in the UK.2 Keith Vaz, the Committee’s Chairman, 
wrote to the Home Secretary, reporting [that the committee felt ] ‘that the UK owes an historic debt 
of gratitude to the Gurkhas for their brave, loyal and distinguished service in the defence of this 
country’. Though the recommendation was initially rejected by the government, in May 2009, then 
Home Secretary Jacqui Smith announced that all Gurkhas with at least four years’ service would be 
entitled to settle in the UK. Lumley declared that the ‘debt of honour’ owed to the Gurkhas would 
now be paid.  
 
As these examples make clear, it is ‘the Gurkhas’ peculiar history which is central to their claims, and 
to the claims made on their behalf. This history, and the debate over Gurkha settlement rights, 
reprises a number of debates which occupied the Indian Army and the Government of India over the 
course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Between 1857 and 1947, for example, the 
Government of India massively expanded the Indian Army’s recruitment of Gurkhas and considered 
schemes to establish ‘colonies’ of Nepalese veterans within India, which advocates suggested would 
provide a self-sustaining source for future recruits and sediment a loyal population within India’s 
borders.3  
As the most martial of the continent’s martial races – the ‘bravest of the brave’, as Martin 
Howe told the HASC – the history of the Gurkhas is a relatively familiar one, and it is precisely this 
history which was invoked, rather effectively, by the Gurkha Justice Campaign. I want to look again 
at part of this history, and to explore in more detail how the familiar image of the brave, loyal and 
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disciplined Gurkha developed. The construction of the martial Gurkha reflects a wider process in 
which various Indian communities emerged as so-called ‘martial races’ and I want to explore the 
mechanics of the process by which in just a few decades in the late nineteenth century, the notion of 
‘the martial races’ became ingrained in the colonial mindset. Whilst we know a good deal about the 
proverbial ‘martiality’ of various Indian communities – Sikhs, Pathans, as well Gurkhas etc – and 
whilst the emergence of these new discourses of race and ethnography has been usefully connected 
to wider debates about race, Orientalism and imperial masculinities, the process by which martial 
identities were ascribed to various communities remains somewhat obscure.  
I want to suggest that looking at this process in more detail not only helps to illuminate the 
way in which ideas of race evolved during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but that 
such an exploration can also demonstrate the variety of interests which were invested in the 
articulation of such identities, and which have, in different ways, been revisited in contemporary 
debates about the right to settlement. I begin by, very briefly, recapping the history of martial race 
recruiting, and then consider some of the ways in which this process has been explained/analysed in 
the extant literature, before  exploring in more detail how the marshalling of various communities 
was made possible and to what ends these alliances were put. I conclude, where I began, with some 
more tentative remarks about the roles, both theoretical and practical, of the ’martial races’ in the 
late- and post-colonial periods.  
 
Context: the ‘martial race theory’ 
In the fifty or so years that followed the ‘mutiny’ of 1857, the recruiting base of the imperial military 
was thoroughly reconstituted. In place of recruits from Southern and Eastern India (the recruits who 
had sustained the expansionist campaigns of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries), the 
British turned to the Punjab and Nepal, as well as to (what became) the Northwest Frontier 
Province, to provide the bulk of recruits for imperial service. The shift in imperial focus – from the 
South and East to the North and West – is reflected starkly in the composition of the Indian Army. 
Between 1862 and 1914, 29 of the 40 Madras battalions were disbanded; 30 Bombay battalions 
were reduced to 18; 28 Hindustani battalions were pared down to 15. In marked contrast, over the 
same period, the number of Nepalese ‘Gurkha’ battalions, was increased four-fold, from five to 
twenty. A further 29 battalions were added to the 28 raised from the Punjab. At the outbreak of war 
in 1914, perhaps three-quarters of the Indian infantry were recruited from the continent’s ‘martial 
races’. Though the exigencies of the First World War did away (temporarily at least) with the 
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selective recruiting practices of the pre-war era, the notion of martiality survived, in various forms, 
through the process of Indianisation in the 1920s and 1930s, and continued to exercise some hold 
during the Second World War.4  
In statistical terms alone, this is a remarkable shift. As might be expected, the rapid 
expansion of ‘martial’ regiments was mirrored by a veritable explosion of writing on India’s martial 
races. The Gurkhas, Sikhs and Pathans – as well as a whole raft of other races and/or castes specified 
as more or less ‘martial’ – were made the subjects of an increasingly extensive colonial literature. 
Although a number of colonial officials had identified certain ‘martial tribes’ as early as 1750, and 
B.H. Hodgson, the British resident at Nepal, had urged recruiting from the kingdom during the 1830s, 
it was in the late nineteenth century that the martial race theory really took hold of the imperial 
imagination.5 The notion of the martial races came to permeate late imperial culture: in 1933, 
George MacMunn, formerly QMG in charge of recruiting for the Indian Army, published his book The 
Martial Races of India, in which he argued that ‘to understand what is meant by the martial races of 
India is to understand from the inside the real story of India. We do not speak of the martial races of 
Britain as distinct from the non-martial… But in India we speak of the martial races as a thing apart 
because the mass of the people have neither martial aptitude nor physical courage… the courage 
that we should talk of colloquially as “guts”’.6  
MacMunn’s oft-quoted account is frequently cited as an example of the kind of 
essentialising discourse characteristic of nineteenth century Orientalism, and much of the recent 
historiography has been concerned with situating the growth of the martial race theory within this 
framework. In a slight variation on this theme, Heather Streets, has suggested that the martial race 
discourse is best understood as part of a pan-imperial discourse of martial masculinities, linking 
Scottish Highlanders with the northern recruits from the subcontinent.7 Noting the important roles 
played by the key ‘martial races’ – especially the Sikhs and the Gurkhas, as well as the Highlanders – 
during the rebellion, Streets account is based largely on an analysis of metropolitan reportage.8 
While popular accounts of the mutiny campaigns (and especially of the role played by particular 
groups in such operations) undoubtedly fed into narratives of martial masculinity, it is hard to 
believe that the good service of such regiments during 1857-58 was the key to the genesis of the 
martial race theory.9 Other explanations emphasise the strategic ends which martial race recruiting 
was made to serve. Cynthia Enloe, for example, suggests that the martial race theory provided a 
convenient means to pursue a strategy of divide and rule, rewarding the ‘loyalty’ of certain groups, 
like Sikhs, Gurkhas etc, whilst justifying the exclusion and denigration of those groups which had 
challenged colonial authority in 1857. Kaushik Roy, with a slightly different focus, locates the genesis 
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of the theory in the growing anxiety felt about Russian designs on India. Alternatively, Richard Fox 
has argued that the genesis of the theory was connected with the development of metropolitan 
notions of biological determinism, highlighting the importance of ecological and environmental 
factors in undergirding concepts of martiality. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly much of the historiography has been  concerned with ‘the reality’ (or 
otherwise) which the martial race theory claimed to represent: did the British really ‘believe’ in 
Indian martiality, or was the martial race discourse the product a calculated strategy of divide and 
rule? As valid, in some ways, as these questions are, I think they have rather overshadowed other 
significant issues. The concern to explain the emergence of the martial race discourse in terms of 
metropolitan notions of race has obscured the mechanisms through which martial recruiting actually 
developed. A more attentive reading of these mechanisms – and it was these mechanisms, I think, 
which lead to the ‘invention’ of the Gurkhas – helps us to gain a better grasp of the theory itself and 
can also throw some light on the way in which race informed colonial government during the 
century or so following 1857.  
 
Reconstructing the Imperial Military after 1857 
Most accounts of the Indian empire in the late nineteenth century have emphasised the practical 
and reactive nature of colonial policy in this period. The hardening of a notion of Indian racial 
difference is generally seen, in part at least, as a reaction to the 1857 uprising. The mutiny, it was 
said, had revealed India as fundamentally unsuited to western forms of government, thus exposing 
the reformist aspirations of the so-called liberal imperialists of the 1830s. Given the centrality of the 
military question in the aftermath of 1857 – and the impossibility of garrisoning India without native 
troops – it is surprising that the history of the imperial military has not featured more centrally in the 
historiographical debates about the period. In fact, in the aftermath of the rebellion, the 
reorganisation of the Indian Army was the central problematic of colonial government. As the 
Political and Military Committee of the Council of India remarked, the question of military 
reorganisation was ‘far from being a mere technical matter’, it was, in fact, they suggested, one of 
‘grave political, financial and even social considerations, and claims to be considered as a measure of 
imperial moment’.10  
In the aftermath of 1857, military policy certainly was pragmatic and reactive. It is also clear 
that a reified notion of Indian difference did indeed play an important role in the reshaping of the 
Army. The Royal Commission charged with reorganising the imperial military emphasised that no 
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single community should predominate within the Army. There was a determined attempt, for 
example, to monitor and regulate the ethnography of those Indians who had volunteered to fight in 
the counter-insurgency operations of 1857-58.11 Whilst there was little agreement over the degree 
of ethnic diversity necessary to ensure imperial security, it was widely agreed that the key to such 
security lay in regulating the ethnographic composition of the native armies. Rose, the Commander 
in Chief, wrote to Wood, the Secretary of State, in 1862, to say that there were simply too many 
good arguments to reach a definitive conclusion ‘The authorities, and arguments, used by them, in 
support of their different systems or sorts of mixture are so good, that as long as the principle of 
non-unity of races or sects in Regiments is acted on, it would, perhaps be safer not to insist, too 
rigidly, on the assertion of any particular principles of mixture, but watch carefully the progress and 
success of each of them’.12 [Some blamed Muslim recruits, others blamed high-caste Brahmins; 
unsure as to the real causes of the rebellion, the military authorities fudged the matter…+ 
In any case, after 1857, the strategic logic of divide and rule was premised on an 
administrative regime of monitor and record. This regime was administered by the Military 
Department, which was made responsible for compiling annual returns to record the ethnography of 
those Indians serving under the Crown and for policing the prescribed ethnic composition of native 
regiments (though, perhaps unsurprisingly, there is little evidence that this was very successful). 13 
In one sense, then, the reorganisation of the military after 1857 certainly reflects the ‘rule of 
difference’ described in much of the literature. 141516 However, we should be careful not to overstate 
the coherence of this ‘strategy’. In the main, the British were forced to muddle through with the 
regiments they inherited from the anti-insurgency campaigns of the 1857-8. In the 1870s, however, 
by which point the shock of the uprising had begun to recede, officials in the Military Department 
talked in much more confident terms about how their knowledge of the Indian population could be 
turned to administrative advantage. The monitoring of regimental ethnography, along with the 
expansion of the District Gazeteers and the introduction of the census, helped to assemble more 
wide-ranging and synoptic taxonomies of race which fed into military planning. The proliferation of 
such knowledge about the native armies after the rebellion mirrors the wide-ranging attempts of the 
new Crown Raj to constitute itself in place of the East India Company.17  
Because of the way in which regimental organisation had been settled after the rebellion, 
routine enquiries into matters of efficiency, discipline and economy were framed in terms of race.  
Such matters were increasingly viewed through an optic which stressed the ethnographic 
distinctiveness of the classes which composed the various regiments.18 After 1857, officers who 
wrote about their experience with Indian regiments described commanding certain ‘races’ or 
7 
 
‘castes’, rather than (as previous officers had) their experience in charge of composite regiments. 
Inevitably, these accounts frequently stressed the ‘distinctive’ characteristics of the officer’s troops. 
The administrative settlement centred on ethnography – which really developed accidentally in the 
aftermath of the rebellion – thus developed a self-reinforcing momentum in which race and caste 
came to seem evermore pertinent to military strategy and organisation. In 1871 and 1872, a series 
of papers authored by serving officers, was published in the Indian military journals, each 
emphasising the particular, martial characteristics of various Indian races, including the Gurkhas, 
Sikhs and Dogras, three of the principal ‘martial races’. In 1874, this enterprise was made official: 
Napier, the Commander-in-Chief, ordered the preparation of short ethnographic surveys of the 
principal races from which the army was recruited, explaining that the papers were designed ‘to 
place at the disposal of British officers, the means of informing themselves of the class 
characteristics of their men’. 19 In large part, this was simply a reflection of the reactive ‘make do and 
mend’ attitude which had necessarily prevailed after 1857; in due course, these writings were to 
play an important part in the codification of new hierarchies of martial aptitude.  
By 1879, when a second Royal Commission was established to consider the organisation of 
the imperial military, the tentative recommendations of the previous Commission were swept aside 
with the bold declaration that ‘India can have a simpler, cheaper and more scientifically constructed 
military organization, with far greater security than the present system actually gives’. 20 This 
confidence was fed in part by the range of knowledge assembled by the Commission and in part by 
the faith then invested in the power of modern arms, communications and infrastructure.21 
Ethnographic returns from the Presidencies provided a means of calculating the relative strategic 
pressures across India: thus, it was said that, in Bengal, only the lower stratum of the Muslim 
population and recently dispossessed landholders ‘really dislike*d+ British rule’, while in the 
Northwest provinces, a ‘more or less enlightened self-interest’ bound the landholders and trading 
classes to the Raj. In Madras the population was said to be passively loyal, while the population of 
Bombay presidency – deemed more ‘martial’ than that of Madras – was said to be generally ‘well 
disposed’. From Punjab, described as ‘home of the most martial races of India, and the nursery of 
our best soldiers’ the Governor reported that the state of feeling towards the government is 
‘excellent… the people of the Punjab remain well-disposed and loyal’.22 23 Where the previous Royal 
Commission had baulked at making concrete suggestions on the distribution of forces, the latter 
Commission declared that its recommendations were ‘based upon sound geographical, political and 
military reasons… the internal security of the country *will be+ enhanced, and our military power 
increased by this readjustment’.24   
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The apparent concentration of technical and scientific expertise (and power) in the hands of 
the British helped not only to restore imperial confidence but also to cement the sense of difference 
which 1857 was taken as a marker of.25 Ironically, the meaning of 1857 became clearer as new 
narratives about colonial rule emerged in this period. It was in part a reflection of this wider context, 
as well as in response to the impacts of regimental organisation, that the new ideas about race and 
martial aptitude came to obtain such coherence. 
 
 
 
Marshalling the martial races 
An officially-sponsored military ethnology developed significantly during the 1880s and 1890s, and it 
is in this period that much of the literature identifies the emergence of the martial race theory. From 
the mid-1880s, specially selected officers were appointed to administer the recruiting of the various 
martial communities. The first officer to take on the newly-styled post of specialist Recruiting Officer 
was Eden Vansittart (an officer in the 2/5th Gurkhas). 26 27 In 1888 Vansittart was despatched to the 
colonial station at Gorakhpur, adjacent to the Nepalese border, where he was tasked with 
overseeing recruiting operations for the army’s Gurkha regiments.28 Vansittart was responsible for 
co-ordinating the operations of recruiting parties in Nepal and for monitoring the quality of the 
recruits enlisted.29 He is best known as the author of the first of the Indian Army’s influential 
‘recruiting handbooks’ – a series of short, practical guides designed to aid recruiting and officering – 
which are rightly seen as a measure of both the growing influence of the martial race theory and the 
increasingly central administrative functions of ethnography. 30 31 Vansittart’s 1890 volume mirrored 
the format of the earlier papers solicited by Napier and drew directly from the contents the 1871 
paper, as well as from the earlier ‘ethnographic’ research of Kirkpatrick, Hamilton and (especially) 
B.H. Hodgson.32 To aid recruitment, Vansittart provided taxonomies of ‘Gurkha’ ethnology: 
classificatory lists of social divisions compiled from and checked against the information received 
from Nepalese soldiers and would-be recruits.33 These taxonomies were intended to aid recruitment 
by identifying Nepal’s most ‘martial’ tribes and clans and by equipping British officers to discern 
‘genuine’ Gurkhas from impostors – a sign that Nepalese peasants were adept at recognising the 
direction of colonial recruiting strategies.34 
Vansittart’s appointment was judged a pronounced success and his organisation of Gurkha 
recruiting provided a blueprint for the reorganisation of recruiting operations throughout Northern 
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India. Lord Roberts, the Commander in Chief in India informed the Duke of Cambridge (the 
Commander in Chief of the British Army) that the ‘really astonishing’ numbers of Gurkhas ‘of 
excellent stamp’ obtained from Nepal was directly attributable to Vansittart’s work at Gorakhpur.35 
Similar depots were then established for Sikhs, Pathans, Dogras, as well as for the other ‘races’ from 
which the Bengal Army drew its recruits. As at Gorakhpur, the depots were placed under the 
command of a District Recruiting Officer, each especially selected for their knowledge of the ‘classes’ 
with which they would deal and each responsible for compiling handbooks of the sort pioneered by 
Vansittart.36 By the end of the 1894-5 recruiting season, the Military Department had received 
volumes on Sikhs, Pathans, Rajputs, Jats, Brahmans, Garhwalis as well as on ‘Hindustani and Punjabi 
Mohademans’.37 The papers were distributed to civil and military authorities throughout India, as 
well as to British Residents in various ‘Princely’ states.38 In 1897, a general compendium on 
Class/Caste Handbooks for the Indian Army was published.39 40 41  
While the recruiting handbooks are often cited as exemplars of Victorian Orientalism, much less is 
known about the labours of the men who produced them.42 Vansittart’s Notes on Goorkhas has been 
widely examined as a manifestation of colonial knowledge but little attention has been paid to the 
mechanics of the recruiting operations which Vansittart directed.43 While Roberts and others 
frequently attributed the success of Vansittart’s operations to the inherent ‘martiality’ of Nepalese 
recruits, and some scholars have identified the hardening of Victorian attitudes to race as key to the 
emergence of the theory, a more attentive reading of Gurkha recruiting points to the more complex 
economic, political and strategic factors which conditioned recruiting operations in Nepal (and 
elsewhere)44 and (more importantly in this context) also demonstrates the bureaucratic and 
institutional networks through which the martial army was constructed, and the martial Gurkha 
properly invented. 
Prior to 1885, when the Nepalese durbar was overthrown, British attempts to recruit from 
within the kingdom had been hampered by the opposition of the authorities there. After recognising 
the new Nepalese administration (and sanctioning the export of modern arms to the kingdom), the 
imperial authorities requested assistance in the raising of additional Gurkha regiments. 45 46 Despite 
securing the putative support of the Nepalese durbar, the new arrangements proved a 
disappointment: not only were fewer recruits forthcoming than was anticipated but many of those 
who presented were either unsatisfactory or unwilling, fuelling suspicions that the Nepalese 
authorities were compelling men to enlist against their will.47 It was against this background that it 
was proposed that a permanent depot be established at Gorakhpur from where recruiting 
operations could be directed by a British officer.48 The depot served a largely administrative function 
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and, indicatively, the only additional expense anticipated at its establishment was a supplementary 
allowance for stationery to enable the officer posted at Gorkakhpur to carry on the ‘great deal of 
correspondence’ that co-ordinating recruiting operations would necessitate.49 The utility of the 
recruiting officer was thus to derive from his ability to coordinate the wider networks which 
facilitated recruiting. These networks – which linked the newly-constituted Gurkha regiments and 
the various ‘classes’ from which Nepalese recruits were to be sought, as well as the Nepalese 
authorities and their agents – involved complex and sometimes contradictory imperatives, which the 
recruiting officer was tasked to oversee, negotiate and direct. 50 51 The emergence of the martial race 
discourse in the latter part of the century needs to be understood in the context of these forces as 
much as it does the hardening of an Orientalist colonial worldview. The synoptic view of Nepal’s 
subjects and potential recruits obtained by the recruiting officer was an administrative response to 
the imperatives of recruiting more than it was an exercise in ethnographic research. By emphasising 
the ethnographic outputs and marginalising the former aspects of the recruiting officers’ work, much 
of the existing literature has skewed understandings of how race informed colonial rule in the late 
nineteenth century. 
When Vansittart took up the post of District Recruiting Officer for Gurkhas he was fulsome in 
his praise for the operations established by his predecessor, [C. Chevenix-Trench52], but emphasised 
the necessity of further investments to secure the flow of recruits.53 54 Having secured the support of 
the Commander in Chief [Roberts] and the British Resident at Nepal, Vansittart was allocated Rs 
5000 to aid his operations and a deputy and medical officer were appointed to assist him at 
Gorakhpur. Vansittart’s account of his first year as Recruiting Officer reported significant returns on 
these investments. As well as noting that all of the vacancies in Gurkha regiments had been filled, 
Vansittart reported that, ‘as compared with the two former seasons… every regiment has this 
season gained in physique’.55 Vanisttart’s cohort were younger (by, on average, around three 
months), taller (by more than an inch) and with a larger chest girth (by an inch and a quarter). So 
successful had the operations proved that Vansittart elected to close the frontier stations to prevent 
the depot being ‘flooded’ with recruits. In comparison with the travails of previous seasons, the new 
arrangements seemed entirely satisfactory.56 Vansittart attributed the success of the operations in 
part to his introduction of a ‘rewards system’ in which Nepalese recruiters were offered financial 
incentives according to the stature and quality of the ‘specimens’ that they produced.57 Of the 872 
recruits enlisted during operations in 1888-9, 471 were deemed worthy of reward, with the highest 
award for a single recruit – Rs 7 – being paid just paid once and with an average of just under Rs 3 
per recruit and 401 recruits carrying no reward. Despite establishing metrics for the payment of 
rewards to recruiters, Vansittart (no doubt keen to emphasise his own role in assessing the value of 
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recruits) was at pains to stress that physique alone did not determine martiality: ‘It is not the height 
and chest measurement which alone constitute the value of any particular recruit. Many other 
points have to be considered; the recruit’s tribe, his clan, his limbs, his age, intelligence, general 
appearance, all have to be taken into consideration’.58  
Rather paradoxically, despite rejecting physical metrics as insufficient, Vansittart codified 
detailed frameworks regarding stature, caste and physique according to which rewards could be 
paid.59 A so-called “recruiters’ return”,  was compiled in order to tabulate the activities of the 
various agents who were despatched into Nepal to bring recruits back to Gorakhpur.  Recruits were 
‘ranked’ according to their stature and general quality, and an ‘abstract of averages’ was composed, 
enabling Vansittart, as well as the native officers in charge of recruiting operations in Nepal, to 
monitor the quality of the ‘specimens’ produced by the various recruiting parties. According to 
Vansittart, the return and abstracts entailed some extra labour but, he explained,  
I feel convinced that it is work well spent, for when the recruiting agent sees that the 
recruiting officer knows all about the work done by him, and takes an interest in the matter, 
he is much more likely to exert himself… The “abstract of averages” enables each native 
officer to see how his last squad compares with his former ones, and thereby a healthy spirit 
of emulation is created which leads to good results.60  
Such records not only helped to identify and reward successful agents, as well as to manage and 
direct aggregate operations61, they also provided the data from which Vansittart constituted the 
annual overview of recruiting activities. By providing a readily calculable metric against which 
recruiting operations could be measured, such information enabled Vansittart to better direct his 
network of recruiting agents and, crucially, to quantify the improvements made in recruiting 
operations as a whole.62 Satisfied by the despatch of the 872 recruits requested in the 1888 season, 
and by the apparent improvements in the ‘quality’ of the recruits, the Government of India warmly 
praised Vansittart’s labours at Gorakhpur and sanctioned his appointment for the forthcoming year, 
appointing two additional assistants to oversee two further depots for Gurkha recruiting.63 64 While 
the martial pedigree of the ‘Goorkhas’ had long been mooted, it was largely through the activities of 
men like Vansittart that recruiting operations were coordinated and, crucially, that the efficacy of 
such operations was rendered legible. As Vansittart’s reports and publications clearly reflect, the 
centralisation of recruiting operations allowed their success or failure to be reckoned in much more 
immediate, and readily comparable, terms. Hence Roberts’ comments about the ‘excellent stamp’ of 
Vansittart’s recruits likely rested on the data which Vansittart had provided.  The success of the 
operations at Gorakhpur was demonstrated by the marked improvements in the physique of recruits 
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enlisted at the depot.65 Ethnography and enumeration thus fell-in together to lend a veneer of 
scientific and statistical coherence to martial race recruiting. Though the ‘improvements’ in Gurkha 
recruiting was attributed to the inherent martiality of the Nepalese, the apparent success owed 
much to the readily quantifiable terms in which recruiting operations were formatted and to the 
economic incentives provided for recruiters who could satisfy these metrics.  
Behind these metrics, of course, were a whole series of economic, political and other interests. 
Recruiting officers played an important role in this relationship: as well as cultivating relations with 
local groups, they were responsible for coordinating the distribution of pensions, for overseeing a 
series of labour exchanges for ‘loyal’ pensioners, and in the case of some Gurkha regiments, for 
facilitating the transit of Nepalese women to establish what were, in effect, government-subsidised 
Gurkha colonies.66 Significantly, at the same time that the Military authorities acted to prohibit 
recruiting from ‘the lines’ in of the Bombay and Madras Armies, special provision was made to allow 
the sons of serving Gurkhas, as well as the orphans of those killed in colonial service, to be taken on 
to regimental payrolls, providing effectively, a rudimentary welfare system for military communities 
and tapping a source of cheap military labour. Though the rhetoric of martiality has largely obscured 
these material interests in the historiography, they are, of course, the key to explaining the 
readiness of particular communities to enlist, just as they are in shaping recruitment to Britain’s 
surviving Gurkha regiments today (and this is precisely the point rather overlooked in much of the 
recent debate about the rights of Gurkhas to settle).   
A similar story is apparent in Punjab, from where the British recruited most of the Sikhs enlisted in 
imperial service. As Rajit Mazumder has shown, the close relationship between the imperial military 
and the Sikh communities of Punjab was key to the economic growth and relative prosperity of 
certain of the region’s communities from the latter nineteenth century.67 As with the Gurkhas, 
economic and political factors were central to determining the readiness of Punjab’s martial races to 
enlist. 
Ironically, by the time that the notion of the martial races had become popularised in Britain – 
through the writings of men like MacMunn – the demands of the First World War had undermined 
much of the recruiting praxis established in the wake of Vansittart’s labours at Gorakhpur. Whilst 
large numbers of ‘Gurkhas’ were recruited from Nepal (with the aid of the Nepalese authorities), and 
significant numbers of Sikhs from Punjab (nearly 100,000)68, the sheer scale of the mobilisation 
transformed the more restrictive recruiting practices which had prevailed before 1914. Moreover, in 
the aftermath of WWI, and in the face of an increasingly strident nationalist critique, the loyalty of 
even the martial races was, on occasion, called into question. Violence following demobilisation in 
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1919 foreshadowed the prospect of Sikh soldiers turning their martial pedigree and military training 
against the colonial state, prompting many military officials, in the interwar period, to reconsider the 
presumed loyalty of their Sikh recruits. In this period, the ‘high spirit’ and ‘adventurousness’ of the 
Sikhs – key markers of their martiality – were reconstituted as a clear and present danger for the 
colonial state. The very qualities which had distinguished Sikh martiality, and which had been 
nourished and rewarded by colonial recruiting strategies, came to be regarded with trepidation. 
These anxieties became all the more pressing during the Second World War, as many traditionally 
‘martial’ communities appeared reluctant to enlist in the British war effort, whilst Sikh soldiers 
played prominent roles in Bose’s Indian National Army. In 1943, Churchill even considered reducing 
the Indian Army ‘by some 400,000 or 500,000 men’ – nearly a quarter of its strength – in order to 
counter ‘subversive attempts’ against British rule emanating from the military.69 Largely because 
they were, to some extent, insulated from the Indian nationalist movement, the Gurkhas avoided 
this suspicion and, at the Partition in 1947, British officers skilfully mobilised the loyalty and good 
service of the Gurkhas to lobby for their transfer and continued recruitment in the British Army, 
much as the Gurkha Justice Campaign has done in recent years. 
In fact, as Indivar Kamtekar has shown, Punjab’s peasantry was reluctant to leave the land and enlist 
(as their fathers had done) because the onset of war and related demand had significantly increased 
the returns available from agricultural labour. (In part, as Mazumder has shown, Punjab’s 
agricultural infrastructure had been built upon the wages of colonial military service). Ironically, 
then, it was the legacy of previous recruiting strategies which helps to explain the reluctance of 
Punjab’s ‘martial races’ to enlist. Those who were more willing to enlist – from communities in 
Bengal and from the South – did not volunteer because of their communities’ martial heritage but 
because military service offered the prospect of steady employment and regular food: in north-west 
India, for example, where neither employment or food was easily obtained, it was found that, within 
four months of enlistment and ‘*i+rrespective of age or initial weight, every recruit gained 5 to 10lbs 
of weight on basic army rations’. 70 It was poverty and hunger, rather than martial pedigree, which 
shaped recruitment during WWII. 
In this sense, the metrics deployed by medical officers at the recruiting centres during WWII tell us 
much more about the motivations which underlay patterns of enlistment than do those which Eden 
Vansittart established in the latter nineteenth century. In fact, as a key figure in the genesis of the 
martial race theory, Vansittart’s work undoubtedly helped to disguise the material interests which 
shaped patterns of enlistment and recruiting. However, what Vansittart’s metrics do help us to grasp 
is the process by which a variety of contingent ideas about race, heredity and ecology were made 
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central to the administration of recruiting and by which the material interests of the colonial state 
and its subjects were often obscured. 
The ongoing debates about the relationships between race and colonial rule, and the apparent 
hardening of such concepts in the latter nineteenth century, have only infrequently engaged the 
literature and sources on the colonial military. This is a shame as the military records of the period 
provide many rich veins of archival material. To properly understand the history of the Indian 
military in the latter nineteenth century, we need to understand the wider shifts in colonial rule 
which occurred in this period: the elaboration of new taxonomies of martiality in the 1880s needs to 
be understood in the context of the parallel and similar developments which codified the 
ethnographic basis of other forms of labour in India, especially notable, for example, on the railways 
or in colonial understandings of indentured labour. While we need to understand the reorganisation 
of the imperial military in the context of the wider history of the period, we need also, conversely, to 
understand the wider history of the period in the light of the evidence suggested by the imperial 
military. If the emergence of a notion of difference after 1857 was key to shaping aspects of 
colonialism in India (as well as of a new sense of empire and national identity in the metropole), the 
history of the military after 1857 also tells us something about the way in which this notion of 
difference was elaborated, the purposes it served and the issues that it seemed to illuminate as well 
as those which it manifestly obscured. 
 
Finally… 
 
Many of the images of Gurkha martiality which I think were ‘invented’ during the nineteenth century 
are still with us: both the conspicuous gallantry (noted, last week, in the commendation for bravery 
of Dipprasad Pun who single-handedly fought off ‘up to 30 Taliban insurgents) and the brutality (in 
2010 a Gurkha recruit was reprimanded for using his ‘traditional’ kukri knife to behead a Taliban 
insurgent, an act which prompted the Daily Mail to exclaim ‘Thank god they’re on our side!).  
For all that these images continue to circulate, I think the most interesting aspect the recent debates 
about settlement rights is the way in which the martial history of the Gurkhas, which once served as 
a means of justifying and rationalising the imperatives of nineteenth century recruiting, and which in 
fact disguised the much more complex process by which recruiting was made effective, has been 
appropriated as a means of laying claim to the benefits of British citizenship.71 If the invention of the 
Gurkhas served – and still serves – British ends, the reinvention of the Gurkhas as British citizens 
shows that, for some Nepalese, advantage accrues in both directions.   
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appointees, in the Indian Army list for 1892 – see Bengal, p. 4… 
41
 By 1899, after a series of delays incurred during the collation of materials for the handbooks, handbooks on 
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offered in colonial writings and has overlooked the process by which such representations were given 
substance and meaning for the colonial military. See Caplan? 
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fundamentally misrepresents the growth of recruiting as an expression of the inherent martiality of particular 
communities. 
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 Sir Donald Martin Stewart, then Commander-in-Chief, proposed that a British recruiting depot be 
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the kingdom and then submit them for inspection either by the British resident at Katmandu or at one of the 
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 IOR P/2556 (Military Department). No. 1355 (November 1886). ‘I am directed to state that, in consideration 
of the great importance of Gorakhpur as a recruiting station for Goorkhas, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to 
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ordinating and overseeing recruiting. Between October and April, the selected officer would proceed to 
Gorakhpur, from where he would liase with the Nepalese authorities and the commanders of the various 
Gurkha regiments in order to direct recruitment. 
49
 As the Adjutant-General made clear, the officer at Gorakhpur was intended to provide a more efficient 
means of co-ordinating recruitment and would not, therefore, entail an additional cost to the imperial 
exchequer: ‘no extra expense will be caused to the state except the Rs 25 allowance for stationery, previously 
asked for, and for which early sanction is solicited, as the officer will have a great deal of correspondence with 
all the Commanding Officers of Goorkha regiments’. IOR P/2556 (Military Department). No. 1355 (November 
1886). In fact, the depot and recruiting officer in command quickly accrued a series of additional costs. 
50
 The Nepalese durbar resisted British requests that the families of recruits be permitted to join their menfolk 
in British territory, citing the inevitable outflow of foreign (ie. British) currency from Nepal as being detrimental 
to their interests. Like the exports of arms which were central to securing the increases in recruitment in 1885, 
the home remittances from serving soldiers were an important element in conditioning Nepalese acquiescence 
to British recruiting practices. 
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 As we have already seen, the previous arrangements had proved unsatisfactory: many of the recruits were 
unwilling, unfit or otherwise unsuitable for imperial service. It is indicative that the response to the initial 
problems premised an administrative and organisational resolution and that the additional cost envisaged in 
the appointment of the recruiting officer was to be spent on stationery. Rather than increasing funding for 
recruits, or seeking alternative means of encouraging the Nepalese authorities to facilitate recruiting (though 
both of these were attempted at other points), the military and colonial authorities sought to establish a 
means of developing and extending their influence over the networks through which they mobilised their 
recruits. This is not to suggest that economic and political factors were incidental to recruiting strategies – for 
the British, the Nepalese and the recruits themselves, they clearly were not – but rather to emphasise that it 
was the coordination and administration of expertise that was central to colonial recruiting strategies at this 
moment.  
52
 The first officer to serve in the new depot was Captain C. Chevenix-Trench, who oversaw recruiting 
operations at Gorakhpur from 1886-8. Trench had previously been on special recruiting duty in earlier years 
[confirm dates] Chevenix-Trench [Confirm dates here]. Vansittart was actually the first officer styled DRO for 
Gurkhas…  
53
 See P/3253 (October 1888), No. 2504, From Vansittart, ‘I would  also wish to say that I have had the 
advantage of seeing the excellent system which Captain C. Chenevix Trench, 5
th
 Goorkhas, established in 
Gorakhpur and of working under him for several months, and I would beg most respectfully to suggest that if 
Government do establish a recruiting depot at Katmandu, that the system which Captain C. Chenevix Trench 
established at Gorkhapur, after much thought and hard work, be carried out in every detail, as far as is 
possible in Katmandu’. Vansittart recommended centring recruiting operations around the British Residency at 
Katmandu, citing the central location of the residency, as well as highlighting the effective transport links and 
other benefits to be derived from relocating operations at Katmandu. The economic imperatives cited by EV 
are important here, as indeed are the points relating to the ‘material’ advantages of the station at Gorakhpur… 
ie. the good buildings are a material instantiation of the colonial state… See P/3253 (October 1888), No. 2504, 
from EV. However, as it then transpired that a relatively limited number of recruits were to be sought during 
the 1888-89 recruiting season and the Nepalese durbar reported that they were content to 
facilitate/encourage recruiting (but still opposed to the British locating their recruiting depot at Katmandu), it 
was decided that no special inducements were necessary.  
54
 In the spring of 1888, for example, the Government of India instructed the British Resident in Nepal (after 
Jan 1888: Durand; before Jan 1888: Girdlestone) to inform the Nepalese authorities that the Government of 
India was prepared to ‘give a Snider rifle for every recruit produced’ in the forthcoming season. P/3253 
(October 1888), No. 2506. As the attentive Commander-in-Chief retorted, this was a generous offer, as many 
‘recruits’ were presented each year who were rejected by the British… See P/3253 (October 1888), No. 2508. 
The Commander-in-Chief had advocated allocating an additional sum of Rs 5000 to the Recruiting Officer at 
Gorakhpur ‘to assist in obtaining eligible recruits’.  According to both the C-in-C and the Resident at Nepal, 
such an arrangement would be much more efficacious than one in which funds were dispersed through the 
Resident and Nepalese minister, much of which ‘would find its way into the pockets of unscrupulous 
middlemen’. The offer of Sniders was withdrawn but Vansittart was allocated Rs 5000. See P/3253 (October 
1888), No. 2514. NB: This is also interesting as it reports some of the ways in which recruiting impacted the 
wider economy and influenced the relationship between the British and Nepalese etc – inflated prices, contest 
over recruits etc… See in P/3253 (October 1888), No. 2515, and check here what position EV holds at this 
point… Check also how the ‘capitation’ grant system worked previously… 
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 P/3477, June 1889. From EV, 2
nd
 April, 1889 
56
 ‘In fact’, Vansittart reported, ‘to prevent the Depot being flooded with recruits, for whom no vacancies were 
left…. I had to send orders to the frontier ghats, sometime before completing requirement, to turn back all 
recruits for enlistment, and not to allow them to proceed to Gorakhpur’. P/3477, June 1889. From EV, 2
nd
 
April, 1889. Evidently, the swift turn around was not simply a reflection of Nepalese martiality… 
57
 Remember to make the point here that this was supported by a statistical point – see Appadurai…; 
Vansittart identified four causes to explain the success of the recruiting operations: the support of the 
Nepalese durbar, the active support of the resident, the introduction of rewards, and the better working of the 
recruiting system. According to Vansittart, the British resident at Nepal brought a good deal of pressure to 
bear upon the durbar, and it was this pressure, he believed, which caused the Nepalsese authorities to be 
more accommodating of British recruiting strategy. 
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 P/3477, June 1889. From EV, 2
nd
 April, 1889. Again, the important point here is abstracting and 
simplification. 
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 Make the connection with the personal experience point above here… 
60
 P/3477, June 1889. From EV, 2
nd
 April, 1889 
61
 Centralisation allowed, for example, for the easy transfer of recruits between regiments preventing 
‘bottlenecks’ in which one regiment remained understrength while another turned away would-be recruits 
away and made possible more substantial forms of planning, as Vansittart’s requests to be furnished with 
ethnographic information on the tehsils of Nepal made clear. Of course, it would be possible to object that this 
point only makes true sense if you take the martial race theory at face value. However, I want to suggest that it 
is a valid point because the British did take the theory at face value, and that such an ability seemed to suggest 
a new kind of power… 
62
 Point here about Smith’s stuff on records and rule etc… Perhaps at this stage say something about the 
importance of native officers – as set out by EV in his report. 
63
 Praise in June, sanctioned next year’s in September… Vansittart himself had recommended that the Senior 
RO be maintained in position, and that assistants be drawn on an annual basis from the various Gurkha 
regiments. Perhaps shift to this point some of the praise for Vansittart in footnotes in the previous section? Ie. 
Condense to summary in II and elaborate in more detail here? 
64
 While various colonials had identified the martial pedigree of the Nepalese, and urged more extensive 
recruiting of the so-called Gurkhas for much of the nineteenth century, it is clear that the expansion of Gurkha 
recruiting in the 1880s and 1890s represented more than the martial proclivities of the Nepalese. Indeed, 
despite the claims of some British officers (particularly those retrospective ones which began to emerge after 
this period), the additional Gurkha regiments were not simply expressions of pre-existing martial tendencies 
but were, in fact, the product of a determined and calculated strategy to extend and deepen the links between 
the imperial military and sections of the Nepalese population. This strategy was addressed in different ways to 
the Nepalese authorities – in the form of political patronage and military support – and, through financial 
inducements to the Nepalese population (or at least to sections of that population) from amongst whom 
recruits were sought. Moreover, the reorganisation of recruiting activities also stimulated wider 
reorganisations in the imperial military. The martial race ideology shaped regimental reorganisation and was 
the principal factor in the introduction of the so-called class regiment and class company systems. With 
regiments increasingly defined in terms of their ethnography, the military authorities undertook an 
increasingly active part in shaping, supporting and encouraging the distinctiveness of regimental ethnicity and 
culture. As Bernard Cohn first noted and as Richard Fox has since argued, service in the imperial military was 
central in shaping the cultural identity of Sikhs. Fox, perhaps, pushes this point too far in Lions of the Punjab; 
the claim, reported by George MacMunn, ‘that it is the British officer who has kept Sikhism up to its old 
standard’, certainly does… 
65
 In 1889, Vansittart reported that ‘as compared with the two former seasons... every regiment has this 
season gained in physique’. The 1889 cohort were, on average, younger (by around three months), taller (by 
more than an inch) and with a greater chest girth (by an inch and a quarter) than those enlisted just two years 
previously. See BL, IOR P/3477, June 1889.  
66
 In 1875, C.H. Brownlow bemoaned the failure of government to maintain better relations with retired  
native soldiers, recounting a story of an elderly native officer who, having been retired some years before the 
rebellion, presented himself to the British on hearing of the rebellion. Wounded in the early stages of the siege 
of Delhi, he recovered to lead his men in the final assault in which he was killed ‘fighting among the foremost’. 
Such men, Brownlow complained, were ‘lost to us both as citizens and soldiers’. C.H. Brownlow, ‘Notes on the 
Native Army of Bengal; its Present Material and Organization, as compared with the Past’, reproduced in IOR 
L/MIL/7/7241, pp. 155- 9. On Gurkha recruiting, see BL, IOR P/3172, July 1890; BL, IOR L/MIL/7/7054. 
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 R.K. Mazumder, The Indian Army and the Making of Punjab, (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003). 
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 R.J. Mazumder, The Indian Army and the Making of Punjab, p. 262 
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 G. Singh, ‘Finding those men with ‘guts’: the ascription and re-ascription of martial identities in Colonial India 
after the Uprisings of 1857’ in G. Rand and C. Bates, eds., 1857: Military Dimensions, (forthcoming, 2009) 
Class Composition of the Army in India; War Staff Papers, Asia and Africa Collections, British Library, 
(L/WS/1/456), p.23. 
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 Kamtekar, ‘State and Class in India, 1939-1945’, Past and Present, 176, p.191 
71
 Several, important issues remain to be unpicked here: most importantly, perhaps, concerning the role 
played by the so-called ‘martial races’ during the Partition violence in 1947. Much of this violence, we now 
know, was perpetrated by groups of men trained by the colonial state and funded, indirectly at least, by the 
wealth accrued as a result of the long-standing and mutually beneficial relationship between the colonial state 
and the peasantry of the Punjab.  If this relationship helped to constrain and retard nationalism for much of 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the late colonial period, it seems also to have played an important role in the violence which marked the 
collapse of that rule in 1947. In 1930, the Simon Commission suggested that, without the British officer and the 
Indian Army to keep order, the ‘martial races’ would eat up the more pacific peoples of the South. The 
Commission, of course, offered this argument as a means of justifying the continuation of colonial rule. In fact, 
most of the violence in Punjab was perpetrated by, and against, Punjabis. Far from legitimising the arguments 
of the Simon Commission, the violence of 1947 should prompt us to ask more questions about the 
relationships between martial identities, economic power and communal violence. If the process of martial-ing 
the Raj began in response to various economic, administrative and intellectual developments of the 
nineteenth century, I would argue that its consequences can be traced through much of the twentieth century 
and, as my introductory examples suggested, they are perhaps still with us. 
